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Input subsidy programs carry support as instruments to increase agricultural productivity, provided they are market-smart. This requires especially proper targeting to contain the fiscal pressure, with decentralized targeting of input vouchers currently the instrument of choice. Nonetheless, despite clear advantages in administrative costs, the fear of elite capture persists. These fears are borne out in the experience from the 2008 input voucher pilot program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, examined here. Elected village officials received about 60 percent of the This paper is a product of the Social, Environment and Rural Sustainable Development Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region in cross support to the Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at lchristiaensen@worldbank.org. distributed vouchers, a factor that significantly reduced the targeting performance of the program, especially in more unequal and remote communities. When targeting the poor, greater coverage and a focus on high trust settings helped mitigate these concerns. The findings highlight the continuing need for scrutiny when relying on decentralized targeting. A clearer sense of purpose (increasing productivity among poorer farmers versus increasing aggregate output) could also enhance the targeting performance.
3 more likely to act in the interest of the beneficiaries than central governments, as local leaders are likely to be held more accountable by their local constituencies, who have difficulties monitoring a distant central government.
Nonetheless, elite capture of the benefits of poverty programs remains a real concern and the empirical evidence so far has been mixed (Mansuri and Rao, 2004) . Alderman (2002) and Faguet (2004) report that decentralization of development programs improved the targeting toward the poor in Albania and Bolivia respectively, while in Bangladesh's decentralized Food-for-Education Program, within village allocation of funds appears more pro-poor than allocation across villages (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) . Park and Wang (2010) on the other hand find that China's community based development program-its flagship poverty alleviation program-only increased the incomes of the better off in each village, and not these of the poor and Platteau (2004) shows that the local elite took control of social fund expenditures in West Africa.
Several factors have been advanced to explain the likelihood of elite capture in different contexts, including political factors such as the local power structure (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006) and levels of awareness (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000) , economic factors such as income level and poverty (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) , social factors such as community homogeneity (Seabright, 1996) as well as design features of the program such as the size of the program (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) , the official eligibility criteria and whether the program concerns distribution of public or private goods (Araujo et al., 2008 ).
Yet, no clear-cut insights have emerged so far about the conditions under which decentralized targeting is likely to be more successful.
Clearly, the popularity of decentralized targeting of input vouchers contrasts with the continuing concerns about elite capture reported in the literature and the poor understanding of the conditions under which it is likely to work better. Whether these concerns are also 4 valid when targeting input vouchers, and if so, under which conditions, is an important empirical question for the input voucher debate as well as for the decentralized targeting literature more broadly, which has so far featured few studies from African settings and has largely focused on studying targeting performance with respect to reaching the poor. This study contributes to filling this void and empirically examines the targeting performance of the input voucher program introduced in Kilimanjaro by the Government of Tanzania in the 2008/9 farming season.
As Wiggins and Brooks (2010) highlight, input voucher programs (implicitly or explicitly) often pursue a dual objective-boosting aggregate output and raising incomes among poor smallholders. 4 To increase agricultural productivity among poor smallholders input vouchers should be aimed at poorer farmers who are most likely to meet market failures in the credit and insurance markets (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011) . However, to boost aggregate output vouchers should be directed to farmers with the highest marginal productivity. Both groups do not necessarily coincide and the performance of community based targeting may well depend on the yardstick used. If so, this would bring an important additional insight to the broader literature on decentralized targeting. Elite capture may for example deteriorate the targeting performance of community based targeting if poverty is the criterion, but not necessarily so when marginal productivity is the yardstick.
Overall, in this study, elected village officials, who can be seen as members of the local elites, receive about 60 percent of the distributed vouchers and multivariate analysis confirms that being a member of the local elite, significantly increases the likelihood of The central government allocates the vouchers to the target regions, 6 taking into consideration the total area of maize and rice under cultivation, the regional maize and rice output as well as the soil and rainfall patterns. To distribute the vouchers further voucher committees were established in the seat of the different local government councils. 7 The
Regional Voucher Committees estimate the demand for inputs using historical production data and allocate the vouchers to the districts. The District Voucher Committees (DVC) are responsible for the distribution of the vouchers to the villages. They collect and review information about their maize and rice production, their input use, and other related information.
Vouchers are then allocated to the selected villages based on the number of farmers who grow maize and rice and the average land size per farmer. The village council, in consultation with the village assembly, organizes the election of the Village Voucher Committee (VVC), which draws up a list of beneficiary farmers for approval by the village assembly. 8 After approval, the VVC 5 Co-financing posed a problem at times and since 2009/2010, the voucher for urea was reduced to one bag. 6 In addition to the central government, there are four levels of local government: regions, districts, wards and villages. 7 See Mniwasa and Shauri (2001) for more details on the government structure in Tanzania. 8 The village assembly consists of all persons aged 18 and above, while the village council comprises of 15 to 25 members elected by the village assembly. The council consists of a chairperson, all chairpersons of the sub-issues the vouchers to the approved farmers and also monitors the use of inputs by voucher recipients.
The purported objective of the program is dual: 1) increase overall maize and rice output, and 2) increase access to modern inputs among poor and vulnerable smallholders. Yet, as indicated above, conflicting targeting rules may derive from these dual objectives. To reduce poverty, subsidized inputs should be targeted to the poorer smallholders. If increasing aggregate output is the objective, subsidies should be targeted to those with the highest marginal input productivity. These often include non-users (Rickert-Gilbert, Jayne, and Black, 2009), and may or may not coincide with the poorer farmers.
During the pilot, which forms the basis for our empirical analysis here, the villages were advised to target literate farming households willing to use the input vouchers for the purported crops and able to meet the co-financing requirement. Application of these criteria in most villages would lead to an exclusion of the poorest (those considered unable to cofinance input purchases). However, the rules were not formally presented and enforced, and actual implementation was left to the discretion of the VVC and the village assembly.
They were however further refined and more formally introduced during the expansion of the program in 2009, 9 when it was also formally established that village leaders had to be excluded from the VVCs and that the VVCs needed to have equal representation of men and women. The fertilizer voucher was further reduced to one bag of urea to reduce the required top up and facilitate participation by poorer farmers. Use of the pilot data thus presents an opportunity to analyze how communities identify beneficiaries in less prescribed environments, the extent to which the advice was adhered to, and whether the adjustments in the targeting rules were well advised.
villages within its area and other members elected by the village assembly. The term of office for all councillors is five years. 9 One important adjustment was the requirement that the beneficiaries should not be cultivating more than one hectare of maize and rice.
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Voucher Beneficiaries in Kilimanjaro
The data used here are from the Vulnerability Household Panel conducted in the Mookherjee, 2005, 2006; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) . 13 Here we explore more directly whether certain groups of people, likely to belong to or being associated with the local elites, are also more likely to receive the input voucher. In particular, we look at differences in 10 eligibility between households with members who 1) hold elected positions in the village 14 ,
and 2) have a member in the village voucher committee.
Looking across the first two rows of Table A2 -1 in Appendix A2 for details). 15 The marginal productivities for each input are calculated both for total crop production and maize and rice production only.
Contrary to the optimal targeting rule for increasing aggregate production, vouchers are going disproportionately to households with a lower marginal productivity for modern input use. The difference is substantial, with the marginal productivity among households that receive vouchers 50 to 320 percent lower than among households that are not eligible for vouchers. 16 Voucher recipients are also more likely to have used inputs before, i.e. vouchers
appear not aimed at pulling in non-users, and they also tend to be less poor, with more land.
In other words, the decentralized targeting does not appear to perform well on either criterion for optimal targeting.
A review of the social factors suggests that male headed households tend to have a slight advantage (5 percentage points more likely to receive vouchers). Similarly, Chagga households (who are more prevalent in the richer northern districts) are more likely to receive vouchers than Pare households (who are more prevalent in the poorer southern district), though there is no discernable difference based on religion. More trusting individuals on the other hand, see themselves left with less vouchers (7 percentage points). Slightly fewer vouchers might have been distributed in more remote villages and villages where extension agents were present, though none of the differences is statistically significant.
Finally, consistent with the guidelines, voucher recipients were more educated and less likely to be illiterate. They were also more likely to have planted maize/rice and had more land allocated maize/rice cultivation in the past. As they derived similar shares of 15 The marginal productivities are equal to the exponent of the fitted value in the production function multiplied by the coefficient of log of the variable in the household fixed effeccts estimation and divided by the value of the variable. 16 Only when comparing the marginal productivity of improved seeds for maize/rice cultivation is the difference not statistically significant.
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income from non-farm activities, this was however not because they were less engaged in off-farm activities. More of the voucher recipients were coffee growers. Recipients were also more likely to have the necessary matching funds as suggested by their larger membership in financial institutions. The large need for credit and limited formal membership in financial institutions 17 of eligible households who eventually did not take up the voucher suggests that access to matching funds has been an issue for some.
This bi-variate analysis suggests that while targeting on the ground appears in broad compliance with the guidelines on paper, the resulting targeting performance is far from optimal from an economic perspective. It is not effective at disproportionately reaching the poorer farmers, if direct poverty reduction or fostering equity were the target. Nor is it effective at disproportionately reaching those with higher marginal productivity, if boosting aggregate supply were the target. In addition, members of the local elite or those closely associated with it are receiving a disproportionate share of the vouchers, suggesting that local politics may play an independent role. Disproportionate reception of vouchers by the local elite does not automatically follow from the application of the guidelines, but through interaction with prevailing community dynamics, it may be well an unintended consequence.
Local Elites and the Voucher Committee Members
To further explore whether belonging to or being associated with the local elite as such affects the reception of a voucher, as suggested by the bi-variate analysis, or whether it merely reflects other factors that simultaneously affect eligibility and belonging to the local elite, a multi-variate analysis is pursued. In particular, let ) (
17 A SACCO is a Savings and Credit Cooperative.
with V a dummy variable indicating whether household h in village v received vouchers, P(.)
the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution, E a set of variables indicating whether a household holds elected office or belongs to the VVC, considered proxies for belonging to or being closely associated with the local elite, H a set of household characteristics reflecting other political, economic, social and program design factors that are considered to affect eligibility and may also affect being part of the local elite (such as education), M a set of village dummies that control for village characteristics that may affect voucher distribution within village as well as those that may affect voucher distribution across villages, C a constant and  the error term. A positive statistically significant coefficient  on E would indicate that local elites are more likely to receive vouchers as such, irrespective of the guidelines or whether they are more likely to meet the economic criteria, pointing to an independent role in the distribution. The results from estimating equation (1) using probit estimation are in Table 2 .
Strikingly, after controlling for awareness and empowerment indicators, economic, social and program design factors, as well as village characteristics that may affect within village distribution, holding elected office, and being a member of the voucher committee, are still strongly associated with voucher reception. Ceteris paribus, members of the village voucher committee are 22 percent more likely to receive a voucher, and those holding elected office 11 percent.
The economic targeting criteria on the other hand do not appear to be followed, with the marginal productivities of fertilizer and seeds on maize/rice not affecting voucher reception, while being poor has no effect and income a positive one. Most of the social factors and the program design factors are also not statistically significant or with the wrong sign (those with more maize land in the past and more education being more and less likely respectively to get vouchers). The other political factors on the other hand (awareness and 14 empowerment) are also highly correlated with voucher reception with those feeling empowered to make important decisions being 7 percent more likely and those regularly participating in official meetings 10 percent more likely to receive a voucher.
As village voucher committee members appear to have such a head start in receiving vouchers, correlates of being a VVC member are further explored. As before, the probit estimator is deployed (Table 2) . 18 Elected officials are 7 percentage points more likely to be VVC member, giving them an additional edge to be eligible for the voucher (over and above their direct advantage). VVC membership is slightly higher among those participating in the meetings and among male headed households. Finally, Pare households appear slightly disadvantaged in being VVC members.
Clearly, being a VVC member gives an important head start in receiving a voucher.
Yet, the task of being a VVC member is unfunded, and reception of a voucher is likely seen as a form of compensation (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott, 2004) . If this is the case and given that they take up 16 percent of the vouchers, the composition of the VVC becomes important.
From this perspective, the adopted adjustment of the VVC rules to exclude village leaders and increase female participation seems warranted, provided their replacements are more likely to meet the economic targeting criteria (either being more likely to be poor or being more efficient at the margin in using modern inputs).
In addition, the large independent effect of being (associated with) local elite on voucher eligibility suggests a pre-occupation with serving one's own group first. And once the elected officials have been served, more selectivity may be introduced. This would suggest that the more vouchers there are in a village for distribution, the better the targeting performance will be.
18 Village level effects were not included this time as in some of the voucher receiving villages there were no VVC members in our sample, which would then be automatically dropped from the sample.
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The bi-variate and multi-variate analyses of voucher eligibility have given a good description of who is more likely to receive a voucher and the extent to which this is correlated with the targeting criteria either derived from economic theory or those given by the guidelines. To enable a more explicit analysis of targeting performance, an explicit targeting metric is introduced in the next section, the targeting differential, which is subsequently used to explore the different factors that affect the targeting performance across and within villages.
Targeting Performance

Methodological Considerations
Following Galasso and Ravallion (2005) , three measures of targeting are defined:
where H is the proportion of all households in the targeted group, s 11 is the proportion of all households in the targeted group that receive the program, s 12 is the proportion of all households who are not in the targeted group that receive the program. G p and G n therefore measure the proportions of households in the targeted group that receive the program and the proportion of households not in the targeted group that receive the program respectively. The difference between the two measures is the targeting differential, T.
If the program is perfectly targeted to the ones in the targeted group, the untargeted group receives none, and the targeted group is completely covered, then T=1; if the program only, but fully, reaches the non-targeted group, then T=-1; a uniform allocation (no targeting) implies T=0. If proportionately more of the targeted than the untargeted group is reached, then 1>T>0; if the program reaches proportionately more of the untargeted than the targeted group, then 0>T>-1.
In addition, Ravallion (2000) shows that the targeting differential at the region level can be decomposed into an -intra-village‖ and an -inter-village‖ component using the
where h is a household index, v is a village index, and v N is the number of households in The relation between village characteristics and the village level targeting differentials is then explored using the following equation:
where T v is the targeting differential at the village level, X is a set of village level political, economic, social and program design factors explored in the literature as affecting targeting performance (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; 2006; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Chavis, 2010; Park and Wang; 2010) , T C is a constant and T v  is the error term.
Rather Limited Targeting after All
As both equity and efficiency concerns could drive smart input voucher programs, the targeting performance of the Kilimanjaro input voucher program is evaluated based on the three following criteria: 1) whether the voucher program targets the poor, 2) whether it 19 G hv =100% if the household is reached and 0 otherwise.
targets those with high marginal productivity of input use, and 3) whether it reaches households that did not use improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers before. The latter category is an important target group for market smart subsidies, as it is likely to meet both criteria, i.e. being constrained in the financial markets (as reflected in their poverty) and displaying high marginal productivity (Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and Black, 2009). Potential displacement of commercial input purchases, a continuous concern with input subsidies This implies that about half of the population is considered as target population. The third targeted group are the non-users of improved seeds and fertilizers, which made up about 50 and 67 percent of the households in the previous survey round. 21 Broadly speaking, and quite strikingly, the targeting differentials hover all around zero irrespective of the targeting criterion (first column, Table 4 explores the correlates associated with these differences in performance.
Elite capture undermines targeting efficiency, but this can be mitigated
In exploring which correlates affect the within village targeting performance, the focus is on a limited set of political, social, program design and service provision factors (Table 4 ). The choice of these village level correlates was guided by the (limited) literature on decentralized targeting reviewed above and deliberately kept to a minimum given the relatively small number of villages in the sample.
To examine the potential role of elite capture, both the number of vouchers received by elected officials and VVC members and the Gini measure of within village (land) inequality (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Araujo et al., 2008) are included, further complemented with a proxy of awareness (Bardhan and Mookerhjee, 2000; Park and Wang, 2010) , which is usually hypothesized to counteract potential elite capture. Across villages, the number of vouchers received by (sample) households with elected officials and VVC members ranges between 0 and 10, with the median situated around 2.4. 23 When expressed in terms of shares of vouchers received by elected officials and VVC members, it ranges from 16 percent for the 10 th percentile village to 100 percent for the 75 th percentile village.
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The within village (land) Gini, which also varies considerably, is included to facilitate comparison with the literature, which has often used inequality to reflect power structures.
Awareness is proxied through the proportion of households regularly using public media.
This is relatively high, with in each of the sample villages more than half the village population (57 percent) consulting public media at least once a month.
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Education levels, here proxied by illiteracy levels among household heads, are regularly considered in examining targeting performance (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) .
While illiteracy is generally low (quasi non-existent in almost half the villages), it still reaches 42 percent in the most illiterate village. In a novel addition to the targeting literature, the level of trust households in a village have in others is further included as a correlate of social cohesion. The proportion of households in a village who (somewhat or strongly) agree that most people can be trusted (arguably a rather demanding measure of trust) ranged between zero and 33 percent with the median situated around 17 percent. Clearly, trust levels are higher in some communities than others.
An important program design feature that has been reported to affect performance is the scale of the program (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005) . This is proxied by the number of (attrition corrected sample) households receiving a voucher, which ranges between 1 and 15, with half of the villages receiving more than 4.7 vouchers 23 These have been corrected for potential attrition bias using the inverse of the probability of being selected in round 3 (appendix A1). 24 While the share could also have been used as proxy, the number of vouchers in a village received by elected officials and VVC members and the number of vouchers received in a village, which together define the share, are introduced separately in the regression, not to constrain their coefficients to be the same. 25 The degree of participation in meetings and associations was also considered as a proxy for awareness. It was not statistically significant in the regression analysis reported in Table 5 and given its correlation with the use of public media (ρ=0.26) and the limited degrees of freedom it was not retained. 20 and half less. Finally, given the important role of extension agents in the distribution of the vouchers, whether there is an extension agent in the village is also controlled for in the regression. Extension agents are located in about three quarters of the villages.
The relation between the intra-village targeting differential and these village level factors is estimated for the targeting differentials based on poverty, marginal productivity and new input usage ( Table 5 ). As the targeting differential is truncated at -1 and 1, the tobit estimator is used. Clearly, the targeting performance is significantly affected by the number of vouchers received by elected officials and VVC members (controlling for the amount of vouchers received in the village). In particular, the larger is the number of vouchers going to elected village officials and VVC members, the worse is the targeting performance. In other words, not only are elected village officials much more likely to receive vouchers, as demonstrated before, this also substantially reduces the targeting performance. As expected, the effects are most detrimental when targeting by poverty-elected village officials tend to be less poor. But targeting effectiveness also tends to decline when efficiency is the overriding concern, in particular for seeds when targeting based on marginal productivity or for fertilizer when aimed at bringing in new users. At the margin, village elected officials are usually not the most efficient input users.
After controlling for voucher reception by elected officials, no relation is found between land inequality and targeting performance, except when it comes to reaching those with high marginal productivity for seeds, where it only has a significantly weak, positive effect. 26 As will be shown below ( Communities, where trust levels are higher, also tend to be better at reaching the poor (Table 5) . 28 While no causality is purported here, it is worth highlighting that it is unlikely that reverse causality drives this result. Trust takes long to build, but little to break, not the other way round (Williamson, 2000) . The trust levels observed are thus unlikely the consequence of the experience with the input voucher program only. With the exception of targeting by marginal productivity of seeds, illiteracy levels were not found to affect the targeting performance. Table 6 , again using the tobit estimator. First, elite capture increases with the number of vouchers distributed, but at a rate of less than one to one, consistent with the earlier observation that voucher coverage can increase targeting performance (at least among the poor). Second, elite capture of the vouchers also increases when intra-village land inequality goes up, providing support for the use of within village inequality indicators as proxy for elite capture. Finally, the further away from the rural towns, the more prone the local political dynamics are to elite capture.
Concluding remarks
Input subsidy programs have once again become a popular instrument in the policy toolbox to increase agricultural productivity across Sub-Saharan Africa. Given that their fiscal burden can be high and typically trends upward over time, they only carry broad support to the extent that they address market failures, such as credit and insurance market failures, and to the extent that they generate multiplier effects by increasing aggregate output and reducing staple food prices. This presumes proper targeting, with decentralized targeting of input vouchers currently the preferred tool of choice. While this ought not to be a problem as such, it was also found that this -pre-allocation‖ of the vouchers to the local elite had a strong negative effect on the targeting performance.
Analysis of the correlates of intra-village targeting performance and elite capture indicated that the occurrence of elite capture was more pronounced in villages with more unequal land distributions and in those villages further away from the rural towns. Somewhat surprisingly, villages with extension agents were found to disproportionately steer vouchers away from new input users or households with higher marginal productivity in fertilizer use, in effect exacerbating the targeting inefficiencies induced by elite capture. When the focus was on fostering production among poor farmers, targeting performance improved when coverage increased and the decentralized targeting systems also tended to work better in villages where trust levels were higher.
Together these different factors resulted in a distribution of vouchers that was not fundamentally better (if not worse) than what random allocation would have yielded, despite 24 the substantial efforts dispensed by both district and community committees. This relatively poor targeting performance undoubtedly also reflects the program's simultaneous pursuit of multiple objectives (raising aggregate output versus raising poor farmers' income), which each yields different targeting rules (targeting farmers with highest marginal productivity versus targeting poor farmers). This leads to a targeting practice focused on the lowest common denominator that tries to serve all in theory, but serves none well in practice.
Three core insights emerge for the future design and implementation of input voucher programs. First, the findings lend credence to existing concerns about elite capture under decentralized targeting schemes, thereby reducing its effectiveness. Second, they suggest that these tendencies can be counteracted with enhanced coverage and a greater focus on higher trust settings when poorer farmers are targeted, and that greater selectivity and/or scrutiny is advised in relying on community based targeting in unequal and remote communities. In addition, extension agents deserve more explicit attention as important factors in influencing the program's targeting performance. Finally, clearer focus in objective could help enhance the targeting performance of input voucher programs. This would also require the development of better proxies to target households with high marginal productivity. While there is a longstanding literature on the development of proxy indicators for poverty, it is poorly understood which variables would be good at proxying marginal productivity in smallholder settings.
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Appendix A1: Dealing with attrition A significant amount of households were lost in the third round of the household survey and there are some differences between the interviewed and lost households (Table   A1 -1). For example, households whose fields are further away or who lived in remote villages were less likely to be interviewed in round 3. Smaller households are more likely to be dropped from the sample. Male headed households and households whose members are elected officials or member of a social or economic group are more likely to remain in the sample. To correct for such uneven attrition, consider a household which represents N households in the region. Its sampling weight is N, usually the inverse of the probability of the household being selected into the survey. Now some of the households selected in the survey design in the first round were not interviewed in the second and third round. If the attrition is random, then no correction is needed. If not, a correction needs to be done. For example, if households whose head is old are less likely to be interviewed in the third round than households whose head is young, the ratio between households with old head and households with young head will decrease from round 1 to round 3. To correct for this bias against households with an older head, a higher weight must be given to households with an older head in round 3. This is the intuition behind the correction for sample selection bias due to attrition followed here (Giles, 2006) .
In particular, if a household interviewed in round 1 has a high probability to be interviewed in round 3, its original sampling weight (N) is multiplied by a correction factor to lower its weight in round 3 29 . If a household interviewed in round 1 has a low probability to be interviewed in round 3, its original sampling weight (N) is multiplied by a higher correction factor in round 3. The correction factor is defined as the inverse of the probability of being interviewed in round 3. Table A1 -2 shows the results of the Probit regressions used to calculate the probabilities. The dependent variables are dummy variables indicating whether the household was also interviewed in round 2 or round 3. Even though it was reported during the survey by the enumerators that households living far away from their plots were more likely to drop out, both the average and the maximum distance to land are not significant in the regressions. The age of the household head and household size are important in explaining attrition. 29 No reweighting is needed for round 1 data since all sampled households were interviewed in round 1.
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Households with only one old person in the first round were more likely to drop out from the survey due to death. Big households were less likely to drop out from the survey.
Female headed households are more likely to drop out in round 3. Village officials'
households are more likely to be interviewed in round 2. 
Appendix A2. The determinants of agricultural productivity
Standard Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated here based on the data from all three survey rounds. This permits estimation of the marginal productivities of fertilizers and seeds (in value). The specification includes the standard input variables: land, labor, capital, traditional and modern seeds (in value) and organic and inorganic fertilizer (in value). As the effectiveness of fertilizer use is affected by the timely supply of water, they are further interacted with the percent of land irrigated. Household demographics and education level, land quality, crop portfolio and access to credit were further added as controls affecting total factor productivity. Table A2 -1 shows the estimation results. In the first two columns the log of total crop income is used as the dependent variable and in the last two columns the log of maize and rice income. Where necessary a small number is added to the log of asset, fertilizer and seed variables to enable inclusion of observations with zero values. Given the specification in double logs, the estimated coefficients on the input variables can be interpreted as elasticities.
The other variables serve as control variables. Their coefficients are the marginal productivities. Two estimates are reported: the OLS estimate and the household fixed effect, which mitigates against omitted variable bias from unobserved household heterogeneity.
Land, agricultural assets, livestock have a significant effect on crop production. The estimates of the elasticity of both traditional and improved seeds are significant, and so are the elasticities of inorganic fertilizer, with irrigation increasing the effect of fertilizer on maize and rice plots. Male headed households and better educated households tend to be more productive. Especially households planting bananas see their crop income systematically increase.
Using the results in Table A2 -1, the marginal productivity of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizer are calculated using the marginal productivities for maize/rice production 30 obtained from the fixed effect estimates. The marginal productivity of improved seeds is equal to the exponent of the fitted value in the production function (using column 4) multiplied by the coefficient of the variable -Log (improved seeds +1) in kg‖ and divided by the value of -improved seeds +1‖. The marginal productivity of inorganic fertilizer is equal to the exponent of the fitted value in the production function (using column 4), multiplied by the summation of the coefficient of the variable -Log (inorganic fertilizer +1) in kg‖ and the multiplication of the coefficient of the variable -Log (inorganic fertilizer +1) in kg*%land irrigated‖ and the variable -%land irrigated‖, and divided by the value of -inorganic fertilizer +1‖. (1) The poverty line is the Food-Energy-Intake poverty line taken from Christiaensen and Pan (2010) . (2) Households with marginal productivity of improved seeds bigger than the village median are defined as productive in using improved seeds. (3) Households with marginal productivity of inorganic fertilizer bigger than the village median are defined as productive in using inorganic fertilizer. Note: Standard deviations are reported in the brackets.*Denotes significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. Weights calculated in Appendix A1 are aggregated at the village level and used in all regressions.
(1) Poverty line taken from Christiaensen and Pan (2010) ; (2) poverty line = regional median consumption per adult equivalent. (3) The sample size is smaller because some villages had no users of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizer in 2004 and the targeting differentials are not defined for these villages.
40 Table 6 : The more unequal land is distributed and the further away from a town the village is, the larger is the elite capture of the vouchers. Note: Tobit estimates. Standard deviations are reported in the brackets.*Denotes significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level.
